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Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining 

for a New Car 

More than 300 paired audits at new-car dealerships receal that dealers quoted 
significantly lower prices to white males than to black or female test buyers using 
identical, scripted bargaining strategies. Ancillary ecidence suggests that the 
dealerships' disparate treatment of women and blacks may be caused by dealers' 
statistical inferences about consumers' resercation prices, but the data do not 
strongly support any single theory of discrimination. (JEL 570, J15, 516) 
The purchase of a new car typically in- 
volves negotiations between buyer and 
seller. Such negotiations may leave room for 
sellers to treat buyers differently on the 
basis of race or gender, especially because 
any individual buyer has little or no means 
of learning the prices paid by others. The 
tests we report in this paper confirm this 
possibility; we find large and statistically 
significant differences in prices quoted to 
test buyers of different races and genders. 
This is true even though the testers were 
selected to resemble each other as closely as 
possible, were trained to bargain uniformly, 
and followed a prespecified bargaining 
script. 
Race or gender discrimination by sellers 
might be motivated by two broad kinds of 
forces. The first is noneconomic tastes for 
discrimination (including traditional forms 
* ~ y r e s :  Yale Law School, P.O. Box 208215, New 
Haven ,  C T  06520 (e-mail: AYRES(& MAIL .  
LAW.YALE.EDU); Siegelman: American Bar Foun- 
dation, 750 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, IL, 60611 
(e-mail: SIEGELMA@MERLE.ACNS.NWU.EDU). 
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ject. Roz Caldwell prepared the manuscript with intel- 
ligence and good humor. We benefited from helpful 
comments by Jay Casper, Carolyn Craven, John Dono- 
hue, Richard Epstein, William Felstiner, Robert Gert- 
ner, James Heckman, and Carol Sanger, as well as 
substantial input from our colleagues at the American 
Bar Foundation. We especially want to acknowledge 
the invaluable advice of Peter Cramton and the sterling 
assistance provided by Michael Horvath. 
of animus or bigotry) introduced into the 
market by a firm's owner, employees, or 
customers (Gary Becker, 1957). Even a mar- 
ket in which no participants are prejudiced 
might exhibit discrimination, however, if 
dealers use buyers' race or gender to make 
statistical inferences about the expected 
profitability of selling to them. Our study 
finds some evidence that is consistent with 
both broad theories of discrimination. Some 
discrimination may be attributable to seller 
animus. But our data also suggest that at 
least part of the observed disparate treat- 
ment of women and blacks is caused by 
dealers' inferences about consumer reserva- 
tion prices. 
Statistical inferences might disadvantage 
black or women consumers even though they 
are on average poorer than white males and 
should therefore have lower (opportunity) 
costs of search (George Stigler, 1968). Dif- 
ferences in information and (direct) search 
or negotiation costs might give white males 
lower reservation prices, despite their 
greater ability to pay and higher opportu- 
nity costs of search time. Moreover, 
profit-maximizing discrimination could well 
depend on more than a group's mean reser- 
vation price (Steven Salop and Joseph 
Stiglitz, 1977). It may be profitable for deal- 
ers to offer higher prices to a group of 
consumers who have a lower acerage reser-
vation price, if the variance of reservation 
prices within the group is sufficiently large. 
Thus for example, suppose that a larger 
proportion of black (than white) consumers 
are willing to pay a high markup, even 
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though the mean (or median) black cus-
tomer has a lower reservation price than 
her white counterpart. Knowing this, deal- 
ers might rationally offer higher prices to all 
black consumers.' 
The rest of this paper proceeds in three 
sections. The first explains the audit method 
used to generate our data and discusses 
econometric specification. Section I1 then 
analyzes the empirical evidence for the exis- 
tence of race and gender discrimination. 
Finally, Section I11 uses some ancillary data 
to explore the causes of the disparate treat- 
ment we found. There is some support for 
both statistical and animus-based theories 
of discrimination in the data. 
I. Method 
A. Design of the Study 
cars at 153 dealerships3 Both testers in a 
pair bargained for the same model of car, at 
the same dealership, usually within a few 
days of each other. Unlike most other audit 
studies, however, we allowed the composi- 
tion of pairs to vary from audit to audit.4 
Dealerships were selected randomly; testers 
were randomly assigned to dealerships; and 
the choice of which tester in the pair would 
be the first to enter the dealership was also 
made randomly. The testers bargained at 
different dealerships for a total of nine car 
models,' following a uniform bargaining 
script that instructed them to focus quickly 
on one particular car and start negotiating 
over it. At the beginning of the bargaining, 
testers told dealers that they could provide 
their own financing for the car. 
After deciding which car they were going 
to bargain over,6 testers waited for an offer 
This study used an audit technique in 
which pairs of testers (one of whom was 
always -a white male) were trained to bar- 
gain and then were sent to nego-
tiate for the purchase of a new automobile 
at randomly selected Chicago-area dealer- 
ships.2 Thirty-eight testers bargained for 306 
'In other markets, competition often gives individ- 
ual sellers an incentive to undermine price discrimina- 
tion by offering posted prices with lower markups. The 
general failure of dealerships to opt for posted prices 
may be attributed to the high concentration of profits 
in a few car sales. Some dealerships may earn up to 50 
percent of their profits from just 10 percent of their 
sales (Ayres, 1991 p. 854). Committing to posted prices 
would force dealerships to forgo these high-profit sales. 
If the extra profits from additional sales at a posted 
price are Less than the forgone profits from selling a 
few cars at extremely high markups, individual dealers 
may not have a first-mover advantage in changing from 
bargained to posted prices. Nevertheless, recent evi-
dence suggests that a move to posted prices for cars 
may be underway (Jim Mateja, 1992; Frank Swoboda, 
1992).
he technique is analogous to "fair housing" tests 
for discrimination in the real-estate market (John 
Yinger, 1986). Audit procedures were also used in tests 
of employment discrimination by Jerry Newman (1978), 
Shelby McIntyre et al. (1980), and in two recent Urban 
Institute studies (Harry Cross et al., 1990; Margery 
Turner et al. (1991). For an analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of this technique, see James Heckman 
and Siegelman (1992). 
Because this study involves deception, it necessarily 
raises important questions of research ethics (Ayres, 
1991: Michael 
- >  - - ~ - ~ -Fk- and Ravmond Struvk. 1992). We - - , -~ -- , , 
minimized the effects of our tests on sellers by conduct- 
ing tests at off-peak hours (mid-mornings and mid-
afternoons during the week) and by instructing testers 
to abandon the test if all salespeople were busy with 
legitimate customers. 
3 ~ ebegan with 404 tests, but because of discarded 
tests and scheduling difficulties, ended up deleting one 
of the observations for 98 audits, leaving us with 306 
tests. While the techniques are somewhat more compli- 
cated, it is possible to analyze both the paired and 
unpaired observations together, using a variant of the 
approaches described here. We conducted extensive 
tests (see Ayres and Siegelman, 1992) to examine 
whether our results are in any way sensitive to the 
exclusion of the 98 "unpaired" observations. We con- 
cluded that they are not, and therefore we report only 
the results from the paired data set in the following 
analysis. 
4 ~ nother words, rather than matching tester A with 
tester B for all tests, A was sometimes matched with B, 
sometimes with C, and so on. 
5 ~ e s t e r sin a pair bargained for the same car model, 
but the test allowed dealers to systematically steer 
testers to cars with different options. There is no 
evidence of this behavior: the average cost of the cars 
bargained for did not vary significantly by tester type. 
The nine models included a range from compacts to 
standard-size cars and included both imports and do- 
mestic makes. Human-subjects constraints prevent us 
from disclosing the identities of the car models. 
'1f they were shown more than one car of the type 
they were bargaining for, the testers were instructed to 
choose the car with the lowest sticker price. 
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from the dealer, or after 5 minutes elicited 
a dealer offer. Once the dealer made an 
initial offer, the tester waited 5 minutes and 
responded with a counteroffer equal to our 
estimate of the dealer's marginal cost for 
the car.' If the salesperson responded by 
lowering his or her offer, the test continued, 
with the tester's second counteroffer de-
rived from the script in one of two ways. 
At some dealerships, testers used a 
"split-the-difference" strategy. In these 
tests, the tester responded to subsequent 
dealer offers by making counteroffers that 
averaged the dealer's and the tester's previ- 
ous offers. Thus, if a tester's first coun-
teroffer was $10,000 and the salesperson 
responded with an offer of $12,000, the 
tester's next response would be $11,000. At 
other dealerships, the testers used a 
"fixed-concession" strategy in which their 
counteroffers (concessions) were indepen-
dent of sellers' behavior. Testers began, as 
before, by making their first counteroffer at 
marginal cost. Regardless of how much the 
seller conceded, each subsequent coun-
teroffer by the tester increased by 20 per- 
cent of the difference between the sticker 
price and the tester's previous offer.8 
Under either bargaining strategy, the test 
ended when the dealer either (i) attempted 
to accept a tester's offer,9 or (ii) refused to 
bargain further. During the course of nego- 
tiations, testers jotted down each offer and 
counteroffer, as well as options on the car 
and its sticker price. After leaving the deal- 
ership, each tester completed a survey de- 
scribing ancillary details of the test (includ- 
ing the kinds of questions they were asked, 
'~s t imates  of dealer cost were provided by Con-
sumer Reports Auto Price Service and Edmund's 1989 
New Cur Prices. As we discuss below, making an initial 
offer at the dealer's cost reveals some sophistication on 
the buyer's part. 
hat is, if the car had a sticker price of SP and the 
tester's last offer was LO, then the tester's next offer 
would be LO +0.2 x (SP -LO). Since the gross margin 
(SP -LO) decreases as the bargaining continues, the 
fixed-concession strategy produced smaller concessions 
in each subsequent round. 
he testers did not purchase cars. If a salesperson 
attempted to accept a tester offer, the tester would end 
the test, saying, "Thanks, but I need to think about this 
before I make up my mind." 
the race and gender of the salesperson with 
whom they negotiated, etc.). 
B. Controls and Uniformity 
The paired audit technique is designed to 
eliminate as much intertester variation as 
possible, and thus to insure that differences 
in outcomes (such as prices quoted) reflect 
differences in dealer rather than tester be- 
havior." We began by choosing testers ac- 
cording to the following criteria: 
(i) 	Age: All testers were between 28 and 
32 years old. 
(ii) 	Education: All testers had 3-4 years of 
postsecondary education. 
(iii) 	Attracticeness: All testers were subjec- 
tively chosen to have average attrac- 
tiveness. 
The testers also displayed similar indicia of 
economic class. Besides volunteering that 
they did not need financing, all testers wore 
similar "yuppie" sportswear and drove to 
the dealership in similar rented cars. 
The script governed both the verbal and 
nonverbal behavior of the testers, who vol- 
unteered very little information and were 
trained to feel comfortable with extended 
periods of silence. The testers had a long 
list of contingent responses to the questions 
they were likely to encounter. If asked, they 
gave uniform answers about their profession 
(e.g., a systems analyst at a large bank) and 
address (a prosperous Chicago neighbor- 
hood). 
" ~ e c k m a n  and Siegelman (1992 p. 188) point out 
that: 
Despite suggestive rhetoric to the contrary, 
audit pair studies are not experiments or 
matched pair studies. Race or  ethnicity cannot 
be assigned by randomization or some other 
device as in. .  . [a classical experiment]. Race is 
a personal characteristic and adjustments must 
be made instead on "relevant" observed charac- 
teristics to "align" audit pair members. 
Because selling a car is a more discrete transaction 
than hiring an employee or renting out an apartment, 
the task of matching testers is substantially easier in 
this area. 
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Before visiting the dealerships, the testers 
had two days of training in which they mem- 
orized the bargaining script and partici-
pated in numerous mock negotiations that 
helped them negotiate and answer ques-
tions uniformly. Unlike many other audit 
studies. the testers did not know that an-
other tkster would visit each dealership, or 
even that the study tested for discrimina- 
tion." 
Despite our efforts to insure uniformity, 
some differences between testers undoubt- 
edly remained. Two important questions 
about such residual differences must then 
be asked: First, are they likely to be corre- 
lated with race or gender? If not, the re-
maining nonuniformity should not influence 
our conclusion that it is race and gender 
that generate different outcomes for the 
testers. Second, are the residual differences 
large enough to explain the amount of dis- 
crimination we report below? Although no 
experiment can eliminate all idiosyncratic 
differences in tester behavior. we feel con- 
fident that the amounts of discrimination 
we observed cannot plausibly be explained 
by divergence from the uniform bargaining 
behavior called for in our script. 
C. Econometric Specification 
In the analysis that follows, we consider 
four definitions of the dependent variable. 
The profit that the dealership would earn 
on its initial offer provides an especially 
well-controlled test for discrimination.12 Be- 
he testers were told only that we were studying 
how sellers negotiate car sales. For the importance of 
isolating participants from "experimenter effects" (be- 
havior induced by an unconscious desire to produce 
the expected results), see Robert Rosenthal (1976). 
I2profits on the initial offer were calculated as the 
difference between the dealer's first offer (before any 
bargaining took place) and our estimate of marginal 
cost for the car. Marginal cost was in turn derived as 
follows. We began with an estimate of the dealer's cost 
for the base model with no options, using data from 
Consumer Reports and Edmund's. We then subtracted 
the sticker price for the base car from the total sticker 
price (including options), giving the retail cost of the 
options. We applied an option-specific discount factor 
(dealer markup on each option, also derived from 
cause the initial offer was made by the dealer 
with relatively little intervention on the 
tester's part, it is unlikely that differences in 
first offers reflect differences in testers' abil- 
ities to follow our uniform bargaining script. 
On the other hand, the profit that the deal- 
ership would earn on its final offer more 
closely reflects the price a real consumer 
would pay. We use both percentage markup 
over marginal cost and actual dollar profits 
as dependent variables. 
Table 1 presents some simple summary 
statistics that reveal the overall pattern of 
discrimination in dealer offers. White male 
testers were quoted initial offers that were 
roughly $1,000 over dealer cost. Offers to 
black males averaged about $935 higher than 
those to white males. Black female testers 
got initial offers about $320 higher than 
those white males received, while white fe- 
males received initial offers that were $110 
higher. These differences are statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level, except for white 
females. 
Not surprisingly, the process of negotia- 
tion lowered dealers' average offers to all 
four tester types. However, dealer conces- 
sions further increased the disparities be- 
tween white males and black testers, while 
only slightly narrowing the gap for white 
females. Thus, there is a stronger overall 
pattern of discrimination in final offers than 
in initial offers: black males were asked to 
pay $1,100 more than white males, black 
females $410 more, and white females $92 
more. Although the differences in conces- 
sions by tester type were not statistically 
significant, it is striking that black male 
testers, despite receiving the highest initial 
offers, got the lowest average concessions 
($290, or 15 percent) over the course of 
negotiations. 
The results in Table 1 are suggestive but 
do not make full use of the information 
available from the audits. One improvement 
Consumer Reports and Edmund's) to each option price, 
to get the marginal cost of all the options. The marginal 
cost of the options was then added to the marginal cost 
of the base model to give the marginal cost of the car. 
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Initial Final 
Tester type profit profit Concessiona 
White males (18 testers; 153 observations) 
Mean 1,018.7 564.1 454.6 
Standard deviation 91 1.3 708.0 (44.6 percent) 
Average markup (percentage) 9.20 5.18 
White females (7 testers; 53 observations) 
Mean 1,127.3 656.5 470.8 
Difference from white male average 108.6 92.4 (41.8 percent) 
Standard deviation 785.3 472.4 
Average markup (percentage) 10.32 6.04 
Black females (8 testers; 60 observations) 
Mean 1,336.7" 974.9" 361.8 
Difference from white male average 318.0 246.1 (27.1 percent) 
Standard deviation 887.8 827.8 
Average markup (percentage) 12.23 7.20 
Black males (5 testers; 40 observations) 
Mean 1,953.7* 1,664.8* 288.9 
Difference from white male average 935.0 1,100.7 (14.8 percent) 
Standard deviation 1,122.7 1,099.5 
Average markup (percentage) 17.32 14.61 
All nonwhite males (20 testers, 153 observations) 
Mean 1,425.5* 1,045.0* 380.5 
Difference from white male average 406.8 481.0 (26.6 percent) 
Standard deviation 973.6 989.9 
Average markup (percentage) 12.99 9.40 
*Average initial profit minus average final profit; average percentage concession is 
given in parentheses. 
*Significantly different from the corresponding figure for white males at the 
5-percent level. 
would be simply to regress profits on a 
vector of variables thought to explain them, 
including dummy variables for tester race 
and gender. This ordinary least-squares 
(OL,S) regression will produce unbiased es- 
timates of the race and gender effects, as 
long as any variables that might be omitted 
from this equation are uncorrelated with 
the race or gender of the testers. 
These estimates will be inefficient, how- 
ever, because OLS fails to account for the 
correlation between errors for the two ob- 
servations in a given audit (John Yinger, 
1986). This correlation arises because there 
are unobservable variables whose effects are 
common to both testers in the same audit, 
including, for example, any factors that are 
unique to the specific dealership being 
tested. Since these variables are omitted 
from the OLS regression, their effect will be 
captured in the error term, imparting a cor- 
relation between errors at the same dealer- 
ship. 
We therefore exploit the panel structure 
of the data set, using the fact that we have 
two observations (one for a white male and 
one for one of the three other tester types) 
for each of the 153 audits. To capture the 
possibility of audit-specific errors we esti-
mate the following fixed-effects model: 
where I I a i  is dealer profit on the ith test 
( i  = 1,2) in the ath audit (a  = 1, .. . ,153), X a i  
is a matrix of dummy variables for tester 
race/gender, a constant, p,, is an unob-
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TABLE 2-OLS AND FIXED-EFFECTS PER AUDIT) REGRESSIONS AND FINAL PROFI.TS (ONE DUMMY OF INITIAL 
AND MARKUPS DUMMIES VARIABLESON RACEAND GENDER AND CONTROL 
Initial Final Initial Final 
dollar profit dollar profit percentage markup percentage markup 
Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed 
Variable OLS effects OLS effects OLS effects OLS effects 
Race/gender dummies: 
Constant 
White female 
Black female 
Black male 
Controls 
SPLITa 
~ i m e ~  
ExperienceC 
~ i r s t  
F[.3,,,,8]: 12.91* 26.52* 14.04* 27.98* 
Adjusted R': 0.10 0.44 0.19 0.43 0.11 0.45 0.21 0.47 
Standard error 
of the estimate: 914.35 723.2 757.1 635.6 0.078 0.06 0.064 0.05 
Degrees of 
freedom: 298 150 298 150 298 150 298 150 
N:  306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
aDummy variable: 1 if tester used a split-the-difference bargaining strategy; 0 otherwise. 
b ~ um b e rof days between this test and the first day of testing. 
'Number of prior tests by this tester. 
d ~ u m m yvariable: 1 if tester was first in the pair; 0 otherwise. 
*Statistically significant at the 5-percent level. 
served, mean-zero, audit-specific error 11. Results 
term,13 and E,,  is an independent, mean- 
zero error term. A. Tester Race and Gender Effects 
Including an audit-specific fixed effect 
transforms each observation into a differ- Table 2 reports the results of OLS and 
ence from its audit-specific mean. Thus, the fixed-effects (one dummy per audit) regres- 
fixed-effects regression (including only the sions explaining raw profits and percentage 
race and gender dummies) is equivalent to a markups associated with dealers' initial and 
paired-difference estimate (Yinger, 1986). final offers. Consistent with Table 1, the 
OLS regressions again suggest that a tester's 
13By definition, the factors that determine p,  are 
gender and race strongly influence both the 
initial and final offers made by sellers.
shared by both members of an audit. Thus, p,  must 
be uncorrelated with the race/gender dummies for F tests for the joint significance of the three 
audit u. race/gender dummies (vs. a model with only 
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control variables and a constant term) are 
significant in all four of the regressions. 
However, the size of the race and gender 
effects is generally somewhat smaller in the 
OLS estimates than is suggested by the raw 
comparison of means. As with the raw 
means, white females are quoted the small- 
est additional markups over white males, 
and black males the largest. The white fe- 
male effect is not significant. 
Allowing for audit-specific fixed effects 
does not change the basic story. There is 
strong evidence for the presence of hetero- 
geneity among audits (the 153 audit dum- 
mies are jointly significant in all four speci- 
fications). But controlling for such effects 
does not have a dramatic influence on ei- 
ther the size or significance of the tester-type 
dummies. In the fixed-effects regressions, 
black males receive initial offers that gener- 
ate dealer profits $1,100 (9 percentage 
points, or 81 percent) higher than those 
received by white males, with the disparity 
unchanged for final offers. While discrimi- 
nation against black males does not increase 
in the final offers, this group still receives 
the smallest average concession (in both 
absolute and percentage terms). For black 
females, a gap of $280 in initial offers widens 
to just over $400 (3 percentage points higher 
markup) in final offers. Initial offers to white 
females are $55 higher than to white males, 
with final offers differing by $130. This 
amounts to about 1.7 percentage points of 
additional markup beyond the 11 percent 
quoted to white male testers. The estimated 
coefficients are significant for the black 
testers, although not for white females. 
B. Control Variables 
Our confidence in the methodology is 
supported by the finding that the variables 
testing whether the study was adequately 
controlled produced coefficients that were 
neither large nor statistically significant. We 
were concerned about possible secular 
trends in the car market because the tests 
were carried out over a period of 4; months. 
The regressions do indicate that there was a 
slight downward trend in car prices over the 
period covered by our tests; but given our 
testing procedures, this trend should not b~ 
correlated with race or gender and is there 
fore i nnocu~us . ' ~  Another concern was tha 
a tester's experience-the number of previ 
ous tests he or she had conducted-migh 
influence the bargaining outcomes. The ta 
bles provide no evidence of any such experi 
ence effect. 
We also examined whether the dealer 
ship's experience with the first tester af 
fected its treatment of the second tester ir 
the pair, as could happen, for example, i 
the seller learned that a test was takini 
place. (The two testers in a pair rarely nego 
tiated with the same salesperson; and deal 
ers never gave any indication that the) 
suspected our testers were not bona fide 
buyers. Both of these facts suggest that the 
probability of discovery should have beer 
low.) The order effect, captured by the 
FIRST dummy, was never statistically sig, 
nificant in any of the regressions in Table 2 
Its magnitude, however, was surprisinglq 
large, with the first tester asked to pay a 
$200, or 1 percentage point, higher markup 
than the second.'' 
The regressions in Table 2 also control 
for a bargaining-strategy effect. Buyers did 
slightly better with the split-the-difference 
strategy than with fixed concessions. How- 
ever, this effect was quantitatively small and 
statistically insignificant. 
14since many car salespeople are paid on a commis- 
sion basis, and since there are weekly and monthly 
quotas, we wanted to allow for possible day-of-week 
and week-of-month effects. In alternative specifications 
(not shown), we tested for these effects. They were 
uniformly small and insignificant, with the exception 
that dealershim' ~ ro f i t s  tended to be lower on Fridays. 
A referee suggested that this might be explained by 
dealers' inferences about consumers' propensity to en- 
gage in additional search. A consumer shopping on 
Friday may be more likely to visit other dealerships 
during the weekend, and dealers may therefore offer 
lower prices at the beginning of the weekend to fore- 
stall this additional search. 
I50ne possible explanation is that sellers quoted 
lower prices to subsequent buyers because the failure 
to complete a sale to the first tester caused them to 
believe that demand conditions were worse than they 
had expected. While theoretically plausible, it seems 
unlikely that the "learning" effect from a single failed 
sale could explain so substantial a price decrease. 
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TABLE 3-OLS FIXED-EFFECTS PER AUDIT) 	 REGRESSIONS(ONE DUMMY AND GLS (RANDOM-EFFECTS) OF FINAL 
PROFITSAND MARKUPS 	 DUMMIES, EFFECTSON RACEAND GENDER AUDIT-SPECIFIC 
Final percentage markup 
Variable OLS 
Final dollar profit 
Fixed effects GLS 
(actual coefficients X 100) 
OLS Fixed effects GLS 
Constant 
White female 
Black male 
Black female 
Adjusted R': 
N:  
Likelihood-ratio test 
(fixed effects vs. OLS): 
Breusch-Pagan testa 
(random effects vs. OLS, ,y;,): 
0.18 
306 
0.43 
306 
325.12* 
306 
14.52* 
0.18 
306 
0.47 
306 
345.30* 
306 
18.90* 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t statistics. 
"Reject OLS in favor of random effects for large values of the test statistic. 
*Significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
C. 	Robustness tions) did not affect the size or significance 
of the tester-type coefficients. 
The differences in prices quoted to the 
various tester types found in Table 2 are 2. Indi~lidual-Tester Effects.-Because we 
robust to a variety of alternative specifica- have multiple observations for each of the 
tions and nonparametric tests. 38 testers (and testers were not paired with 
a single, fixed partner), we can also test for 
1. Fixed L3ersus Random Effects.-It is the presence of individual-tester effects. To 
possible to compare the fixed-effects speci- do this, we simply reorganize the panel data 
fication (one dummy variable for each of by individual testers (for example, IIi,= 
the 153 audits) described earlier with a dealer profit on the ith test for the tth 
random-effects (generalized least-squares tester) and compute a standard random-
[GLS]) specification in which each audit's effects regression.16 
error term is treated as a random draw from 
a common distribution. Table 3 presents 
such comparisons for the final profit and 
final markup equations, focusing on the 1h Note that the training and selection of the testers 
tester-type variables (which vary within an were designed to eliminate as much intertester varia- 
audit). tion as possible. Thus, we would expect to find little or 
Like the fixed-effects estimates, the GLS no evidence of individual-tester effects in our data. For 
reasons described above, however, we cannot test for 
estimates indicate heterogeneity across au- the presence of individual-tester effects that are corre- 
dits: a Breusch-Pagan test indicates that the lated with testers' race or gender. 
estimated variance of the audit-specific er- A bed-effects specification with one dummy vari- 
ror term is significantly greater than zero in able for each individual tester is equivalent to subtract- 
ing off the tester-specific mean for each variable. This the random-effects specification. However, 
meanx that any variables that do not vary over time for 
controlling for this heterogeneity (with ei- each individual tester (including the tester race and 
ther the random- or fixed-effects specifica- gender dummies) are indistinguishable from the 
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Rerunning the four specifications of Table 
2, we found little evidence that significant 
individual-tester effects were present. For 
three of the four regressions, we found that 
the estimated variance of the individual-
tester effects was less than zero, indicating 
that the individual effects were not statisti- 
cally significant. (Positive variance estimates 
are not guaranteed in a finite sample, even 
though the variance is estimated consis-
tently [William Greene, 1991 p. 4931). A 
Breusch-Pagan test statistic of 16.71 in the 
final dollar-profit regression indicates that 
there was some heterogeneity across testers 
(i.e., the variance of the individual-specific 
error was significantly greater than zero). 
The estimated coefficients in this regres-
sion, however, were virtually identical to the 
OLS and GLS estimates presented in Table 
2, and all of the black-tester coefficients 
remained significant. 
3. Attempted Acceptances Llersus Refusals 
to Bargain Further.-We also investigated 
whether our findings of race and gender 
discrimination might be linked to the fact 
that the dealerships' final offers were some- 
times refusals to bargain further and some- 
times acceptances of tester offers." By 
adding an ACCEPT dummy ( = 1 if the 
seller attempted to accept a tester offer) to 
the regressions of Table 2, we found that 
sessions ending in attempted acceptances 
had a $400 lower final profit than those that 
ended in a refusal to bargain (t  statistic of 
4.20). The size of this acceptance effect, 
individual-tester fixed effect and cannot be used, thus 
making the individual-tester, fixed-effect model inap- 
propriate for examining race and gender effects (Jerry 
Hausman and William Taylor, 1981). 
" ~ n  a parallel effort, we examined whether our 
results were affected by the fact that sellers sometimes 
made unsolicited initial offers and sometimes needed 
to have offers elicited by the testers. Logit regressions 
indicated that dealers were less likely to make an 
unsolicited initial offer to white males than to other 
tester types, but that this difference was not statistically 
significant. Solicited initial offers were significantly 
larger than unsolicited initial offers, but there was na 
statistical difference in final offers between tests that 
began with elicited initial offers and those that began 
with unsolicited offers by the seller. 
however, was the same for all testers: inter- 
acting the ACCEPT dummy with the tester 
type yielded small and insignificant coeffi- 
c i e n t ~ . ' ~  
Dealers' willingness to offer lower prices 
to white males was reflected in a greater 
willingness to continue bargaining until an 
acceptable offer was made. When the tester 
was a white male, 25.6 percent of the tests 
ended in attempted seller acceptances; this 
figure was only 14.9 percent for the other 
tester types. The fact that sellers are more 
likely to accept offers from white males ac- 
tually biases our estimates against finding 
discrimination, however, because accep-
tances only provide an upper bound for 
sellers' reservation prices. That is, in those 
cases where dealers attempted to accept an 
offer from a white male tester, the dealers 
might have been willing to make an even 
lower offer, which would have increased our 
measure of discrimination. Overall, our 
findings of discrimination do not seem to be 
sensitive to the fact that most negotiations 
did not end in an attempted acceptance. 
4. Nonparametric Tests for Race and Gen- 
der Effects.-If race or gender were unre- 
lated to the prices quoted to testers, we 
would expect that the benchmark white male 
testers would get lower offers than their 
audit partners half the time, while doing 
worse than their counterparts in the remain- 
ing half of the tests. As Table 4 indicates, 
however, this was not the case. Overall, 
white males did better than others in roughly 
two-thirds of the paired tests (for both ini- 
tial and final offers). A likelihood-ratio test 
reveals that the differences from 50 percent 
were all statistically significant at the 5-per- 
cent level. 
The disparities are even larger in dolla~ 
terms: in tests in which white male tester$ 
received the lower final offer, they did $897 
better than their counterparts on average 
Where the nonwhite males did better, the! 
1 8 ~ h eACCEPT variable may not be exogenous i 
these regressions, because higher profitability ma 
cause the dealer to accept a tester's offer. 
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TABLE 4-PROPORTION OF TESTSIN WHICH WHITE 

MALE OBTAINED THE BETTER RESULT 

Percentages 
Initial Final 
Test urofits urofits 
White males vs. all others 
(153 pairs) 68.0 66.7 
White males vs. white females 
(53 pairs) 58.4 56.6 
White males vs. black males 
(40 pairs) 87.5 85.0 
White males vs. black females 
(60 pairs) 63.3 61.7 
Notes: All values are significantly different from 50 
percent at the 1-percent level using a likelihood-ratio 
test in 43.5 percent of the tests, ~ h i t e  males 
received an inltral offer that was lower than the $final 
offer made to the nonwhite male tester. 
beat the white male by only $167. Perhaps 
even more startling, in 43.5 percent of the 
tests, white males received an initial offer 
that was lower than the final offer made to 
their audit-mate. That is, without any nego- 
tiating at all, 43 percent of white males 
obtained a better price than their counter- 
parts achieved after an average of 45 min- 
utes of bargaining. Wilcoxon signed-ranks 
tests (Morris DeGroot, 1986 pp. 573-76) 
similarly reveal that the median final and 
initial profits with white males were signifi- 
cantly lower than those with the other tester 
types. This suggests that white males did 
better on average not simply because a few 
of them received very low offers, but be- 
cause the entire distribution of offers to 
white males was lower than for the other 
tester types. 
Two conclusions emerge from this analy- 
sis. First, both final and initial offers display 
large and significant differences in outcomes 
by race and gender. For black males, the 
final markup was 8-9 percentage points 
higher (24 percent vs. 15 percent) than for 
white males; the equivalent figures are 3.5-4 
percentage points for black females and 
about 2 percentage points for white fe-
males. Second, the results are robust. The 
magnitude and significance of the race and 
gender effects under various alternative 
specifications, combined with the insignifi- 
cance of the individual-tester effects, rein- 
force our confidence in these conclusions. 
111. The Sources of Discrimination 
In this section we try to explain the race 
and gender discrimination uncovered in our 
testing. It is particularly difficult to distin- 
guish between competing hypotheses with- 
out an explicit model of how bigotry or 
asymmetric information might influence 
sellers' bargaining behavior. Either animus 
or statistical inference might cause sellers to 
make higher take-it-or-leave-it offers to 
some groups. But when sellers can make 
alternating offers over time, as occurs dur- 
ing the purchase of a new car, the conse- 
quences of animus or asymmetric informa- 
tion become much murkier.19 
Thus, our results should not be read as 
explicit tests of the two theories of discrimi- 
nation. Instead, we simply explore the ef- 
fects of some plausible covariates on the 
level of discrimination, as well as consider- 
ing some ancillary evidence from other re- 
search. We conclude that the dealerships' 
disparate treatment of women and blacks 
may be caused by dealers' statistical infer- 
ences about consumers' reservation prices, 
but the results do not strongly support any 
single theory of discrimination. 
A. Animus-Based Discrimination 
Discrimination might be caused by the 
bigotry of a dealership's owners, employees, 
or customers. In this view, the higher prices 
paid by minorities and women serve to com- 
pensate the bigoted market participants for 
having to associate with the victims of dis- 
crimination (Gary Becker, 1957). 
In Table 5, we report regressions (analo- 
gous to Table 2) testing whether the race 
1'9 For a bargaining-theoretic analysis of discrimina- 
tion in the sale of new cars that shows how different 
animus-based and statistical theories disparately affect 
a seller's equilibrium negotiation strategy, see 
Narasimhan Srinivasan and Kuang-Wei Wen (1991) or 
Ayres (1994). 
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TABLE 5-OLS AND GLS (RANDOM AUDIT-SPECIFIC REGRESSIONS AND FINALEFFECTS, ERRORS) OF INITIAL 
PROFITS/MARKUPSON RACE/GENDERDUMMIESAND OTHER VARIABLES 
-- - -  
Initial Final 
Initial Final percentage percentage 
dollar profit dollar profit markup markup 
Random Random Random Random 
Variable OLS effects OLS effects OLS effects OLS effects 
Race/gender dummies: 
Constant 1,704.46* 
(6.52) 
White female 130.12 
(0.98) 
Black male 985.19* 
(6.59) 
Black female 267.14* 
(2.08) 
Neighborhood variables: 
Income X 10-" 
Black tester x 
suburb 
Minority-owned 
dealerh 
Black tester X 
minority-owned dealer 
Percentage black 
in neighborhood 
Black tester X 
percentage black in 
neighborhood 
Seller interactions: 
Tester black male, 
seller white female 
Tester black male, 
seller black male 
Tester black female, 
seller white female 
Tester black female, 
seller black male 
Tester white female, 
seller white female 
Tester white female, 
seller black male 
Adjusted R': 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.39 
Standard error 
of the estimate: 827.8 687.2 0.071 0.056 
Degrees of freedom: 28 1 28 1 28 1 28 1 
N :  306 306 306 306 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. See the text for explanation of the interpretation of the interaction 
effects. Note that all the regressions also include dummy variables for eight of the nine car models we tested, 
omitting the least expensive car. 
"Dummy variable = 1 if dealership in suburb; 0 otherwise. 
' ~ u m m ~  1 if minority-owned dealer; 0 otherwise. variable = 
*Significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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and gender of the dealership's owner, em- 
ployees, or customers influenced the amount 
of dis~rimination.~' One conclusion emerges 
from Table 5: the neighborhood effects have 
virtually no power in explaining discrimina- 
tion. Moreover, the tester-type dummies still 
have roughly the same size and significance 
level when the neighborhood effects are in- 
c ~ u d e d . ~ 'This finding, along with some an- 
cillary information, argues against standard 
animus-based theories as the primary expla- 
nation for the discrimination we observed. 
1. Owner Animus.-If owners are the 
source of animus, black-owned dealerships 
should presumably exhibit less discrimina- 
tion against blacks than dealerships owned 
by whites.22 The regressions in Table 5 con-
''TO simplify interpretation of the interaction terms, 
we follow the procedure suggested by John Yinger 
(1986 p. 888). Consider, for example, the interaction of 
a white female tester with a black male seller. Let SBM 
be a dummy variable which is 1 if the seller is a black 
male, and let TWF be a dummy that is 1 if the tester is 
a white female. Then the normal interaction specifica- 
tion would be TWFXSBM. Instead, we use 
SBM- SBM,/NTwF 
I = TWF 
That is, we subtract the average value of SBM for all 
white female testers (simply the percentage of all white 
female tests in which the seller was a black male). This 
subtraction allows us to interpret the TWF coefficient 
as the average level of discrimination facing white 
female testers, while the interaction term represents 
the marginal effect of facing a black male seller. 
? I  These regressions also contain dummy variables 
for eight of the nine car models (omitting the least 
expensive car). In other regressions, we investigated 
whether tester groups encountered different dealer 
behavior when bargaining for foreign or luxury cars. 
We included variables interacting the tester dummies 
with dummies indicating whether the car model was 
domestically produced and whether the car was an 
economy or standard/luxury model. These interaction 
coefficients were uniformly small and insignificant, in- 
dicating that the pattern of discrimination does not 
depend on the model class or whether the car is 
ma?,ufactured domestically. 
--Because there are so few black-owned dealerships 
(we were able to identify only nine in our sample), they 
might be able to "free-ride" on the market discrimina- 
tion by charging their black customers a price that 
tain a dummy variable MINOWN for 
minority-owned dealerships, as well as an 
interaction dummy (equaling 1 when both 
the tester and the owner were black). None 
of these coefficients was significant in any of 
the regressions, indicating that the seller's 
race did not influence the bargaining out- 
come and that black testers did not fare 
better at black-owned dealerships. 
Bigoted owners should also be more likely 
to discriminate against their own employees 
(with whom they presumably have to associ- 
ate closely over an extended period of time) 
than against their customers. Given that 
owners are willing to hire nonwhite and 
nonmale salespeople (who comprised nearly 
one-fourth of those encountered in our 
tests),23 it seems implausible that they would 
need a $500 higher markup to compensate 
for selling to customers who are not white 
males. 
2. Employee Animus.-Employees-in 
this case. than 
ship owners are another possible source of 
animus. Again, however, the magnitudes of 
the discrimination do not seem 
with this source. F~~example, it 
is difficult to imagine that the $1,000 addi- 
tional markup to black males represents 
compensation to white salespeople for the 
disutility of having to spend 45 minutes ne- 
gotiating with them. The interaction effects 
in the regressions of Table 5 test whether 
the gender and race of the salesperson af- 
fected the amount of discrimination. The 
coefficients were uniformly insignificant, 
reflects the discriminatory premium at white-owned 
dealerships. It is also theoretically possible that black 
owners dislike dealing with blacks, but at a minimum 
this would implicate a nontraditional form of discrimi- 
nation. We used the "Black Pages," (an analogue of 
the Yellow Pages which lists firms that are more than 
50-percent black-owned), supplemented by a City of 
Chicago listing of minority-owned businesses as sources. 
Listing in either source is voluntary, so we may have 
excluded some black-owned dealerships. We were un- 
able to find any female-owned dealerships in analogous 
sources for women. 
230f  the 306 tests, 23.2 percent involved salespeople 
who were not white males. 
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casting doubt on employee animus as a 
source of discrimination. Black testers did 
no worse when buying from white salespeo- 
ple, nor did women get worse deals when 
the salesperson was male,24 as one would 
expect if salesperson animus were the mo- 
tive for discrimination. In addition, we 
would expect that bigoted salespeople would 
want to spend less time with non-white-male 
testers than with white males. In fact, how- 
ever, salespeople spent nearly 13-percent 
longer negotiating with the "minority" 
testers than with the white males, which 
casts doubt on salesperson animus as the 
source of price difference^.^^ We do not 
want to exclude this hypothesis completely, 
however, because our testers did report 
some instances of explicitly hostile racist or 
sexist language from the 
3. Customer Animus.-Fellow-customers 
should also be considered as a source of 
24 In fact, an earlier pilot study (Ayres, 1991) found 
that women and blacks did worse when negotiating 
against a salesperson of the same race/gender and got 
their best deals, on average, from white males. The 
earlier study also found that testers were more likely to 
"draw" a salesperson of the same race and gender as 
themselves (who then tended to charge higher prices). 
We detected no evidence of steering in these data, 
however. The race and gender of testers and sellers 
appeared to be independent of each other, as the 
following table demonstrates: 
Seller 
White White Black Black 
Tester male female male female 
White male 123 11 17 2 
White female 37 4 11 1 
Black male 46 6 7 1 
Black female 29 5 6 0 
( N  = 306 observations; x~;,= 5.64, p = 0.78). 
2 5 ~ h eaverage test by a white male lasted 36.2 
minutes. The average for the other testers was 40.8 
minutes. Although the 4.6-minute difference is small, a 
t test reveals that the two means are significantly 
different at the 0.001 level. The shorter negotiations 
with white males could be explained by a dealer prefer- 
ence for wasting the time of minority buyers. 
26 Dealers made hostile race- or  gender-based state- 
ments in about 4 percent of the tests. 
animus against black or women shoppers. 
For example, a dealership might charge 
more to black or female consumers if their 
presence in the showroom made it less likely 
that others (whites, men) would shop there. 
The evidence for this kind of discrimination 
is mixed. First, concerns about the reactions 
of other customers should lead dealers to 
shepherd blacks and women out of the 
showroom as rapidly as possible (to avoid 
their being seen by other potential cus-
tomers). Yet it was white male testers, rather 
than blacks or white women, who had the 
shortest average negotiating sessions. In ad- 
dition, the customer-based theory implies 
that the extent of customer prejudice should 
vary by neighborhood: black testers buying 
in a white neighborhood (where most other 
customers are likely to be white) should do 
worse than in a black n e i g h b~ r h o od . ~~  Table 
5 does indicate that black testers shopping 
in black neighborhoods may receive lower 
offers. The coefficients on these interaction 
variables were large (roughly -$500), but 
were poorly measured ( t  statistics between 
-0.9 and - 1 . 31 . ~~  
In sum, animus-based theories of discrim- 
ination do not find support in our analysis 
of dealership characteristics. Consistent with 
Becker's analysis of the effects of competi- 
tion on discrimination, the evidence for 
owner and employee animus is the weakest. 
The large but insignificant coefficients for 
* '~e i~hbo rhoodsare defined by what the City of 
Chicago (1992 p. 1) calls "Community Areas." Each 
has 30.000-60.000 people. "Community areas are de- 
fined by the city of Chicago as groups of census tracts. 
They were first identified in the 1930's by the Social 
Science Research Council of the University of Chicago. 
They correspond roughly to informally recognized 
neighborhoods such as Lakeview and Hyde Park. The 
boundaries have changed very little since their incep- 
tion.. . ." 
2R~o h nYinger (1986) concludes that, in the housing 
market, discrimination against blacks is motivated by 
realtors' perceptions that other renters o r  house buyers 
would disapprove of having a black neighbor. Interest- 
ingly, Yinger finds, as we do, that black females en-
counter substantially less discrimination than black 
males (p. 891). Because of the discrete nature of auto- 
mobile purchases, animus by fellow consumers strikes 
us as inherently more plausible in the housing context 
than in the automobile showroom. 
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black testers in black neighborhoods might 
raise some concern, however, that customer 
animus may play a role in the higher prices 
charged to blacks. 
B. Statistical Theories 
"Statistical discrimination" is based not 
on a psychological distaste for associating 
with blacks or women, but rather on sellers' 
use of observable variables (such as race or 
gender) to make inferences about a relevant 
but unobservable variable (Edmund Phelps, 
1972). In the labor market, productivity is 
the relevant unobservable variable. In car 
negotiations, dealers might use a customer's 
race or gender to make inferences about a 
buyer's knowledge, search and bargaining 
costs, or, more generally, her reservation 
price at the specific dealership. If sellers 
believe, for example, that women are on 
average more averse to bargaining than men, 
it may be profitable to quote higher prices 
to women customers.2y 
Dealers might also make racial or gender 
inferences about the expected costs of con- 
tracting-including, for example, the ex-
pected costs of default on car loans. The 
script attempted to eliminate cost-based sta- 
tistical discrimination by having all testers 
volunteer early in the negotiations that they 
were providing their own financing. This 
disclosure indicated that the dealer should 
not have to bear a risk of buyer defauk3' 
*'AS one car salesman turned consumer advocate 
(Darrell Parrish, 1985 p. 3) wrote: 
. . .Salesmen.. . categorize people into "typical" 
buyer categories. During my time as a salesman 
I termed the most common of these the "typi- 
cally uninformed buyer". . . . [In addition to their 
lack of information, these] buyers tended to 
display other common weaknesses. As a rule 
they were indecisive, wary, impulsive and, as a 
result, were easily misled. Now take a guess as 
to which gender of the species placed at the top 
of this "typically easy to mislead" category? 
You guessed it-women. 
3 0 ~ v e nthough all testers volunteered that they did 
not need financing, dealers might disparately assess the 
credibility of this information depending on the gender 
and race of the tester. If statistically valid, this infer- 
ence could form the basis for cost-based statistical 
discrimination. 
The plausibility of revenue-based statisti- 
cal discrimination as an explanation for our 
results is heightened by the fact that sales- 
people have their own term for a kind of 
statistical discrimination, which they call 
"qualifying the buyer." "Qualifying" is the 
process of estimating how much the buyer is 
willing/able to pay on the basis of direct 
observation (how the buyer is dressed, what 
kind of car she is currently driving) and 
answers to questions the seller asks ("How 
did you get to the dealership?" "Have you 
visited other dealerships?"). This section 
looks at possible causes of statistical dis-
crimination and examines whether they are 
consistent with the evidence. 
1. Search Costs.-Sellers might perceive 
that race and gender are related to buyers' 
search costs for several reasons. For exam- 
ple, black consumers might have higher 
search costs because they are less likely 
than whites to own a car at the time they 
are shopping for a new one (and therefore 
might have more difficulty traveling to mul- 
tiple dealerships) (Fred Mannering and 
Clifford Winston, 1991 p. 98).31 
Profit-maximizing dealers might also make infer-
ences about the profits from ancillary sales, so statisti- 
cal discrimination could also be caused by dealers' 
inferences about the likelihood of repeat purchases, 
referrals, o r  repair service. To  dampen the importance 
of such inferences, testers initially volunteered to sales- 
people that they were moving out of the state within a 
month. However, having more than one tester make 
this representation at a single dealership increased the 
likelihood that dealers would suspect a test, and so this 
was discontinued. 
3 1 ~ h e r eis a large, uneven, and largely dated mar- 
keting literature which does seem to support the no-
tion that "[v]ariation in prepurchase search behavior is 
related to racial differences" (Carl Block, 1972 p. 9). 
Laurence Feldman and Alvin Starr (1968 pp. 216-26) 
also conclude that there are differences in search be- 
havior by race, although they find that these diminish 
after controlling for income. For a survey of studies 
examining differences in car ownership rates by race, 
see Raymond Bauer and Scott Cunningham (1970 
pp. 157-60), who conclude that blacks are less likely to 
own a car than whites (even when controlling for 
income). For a theoretical examination of some possi- 
ble effects of differences in search costs on the ability 
of sellers to discriminate, see Robert Masson (1973). 
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Our data provide some evidence that sell- 
ers considered search costs to be (differen- 
tially) important for different groups of 
testers. Non-white-male testers were more 
than 2.5 times as likely as white males to be 
asked how they got to the dealership, sug- 
gesting that dealers show particular interest 
in determining whether non-white-males 
have substantial opportunities to search. In 
addition, testers who revealed that they did 
not own a car were asked to pay $127 more 
while those who indicated that they had 
visited other dealerships saved $122 (al- 
though these results were only significant at 
a 20-percent 
The evidence does not uniformly support 
a search-cost explanation, however. If sell- 
ers are sensitive to buyers' search costs in 
setting prices, we would expect black testers 
to receive better deals (relative to whites) in 
the suburbs than at urban dealerships. By 
traveling the substantial distance from the 
center city to the Chicago suburbs (where 
very few blacks live), blacks are in effect 
signaling to suburban dealers that they are 
willing and able to undertake an extensive 
search for a car. Contrary to this theory, 
however, the coefficient for blacks negotiat- 
ing in suburbs was a positive $64 for initial 
offers and $264 for final offers ( t  statistics of 
0.25 and 1.22, respectively). Moreover, ini- 
tial and final offers for black testers in all- 
white neighborhoods were $675 and $600 
higher than in all-black neighborhoods 
( t  statistics of 1.20 and 1.28). The presence 
of black customers in white neighborhoods 
did not signal a willingness to search that 
translated into lower dealer offers.33 
32 These figures were derived by constructing dummy 
variables for the tests in which this information was 
revealed and by then rerunning the final-profit regres- 
sion in Table 1. Testers revealed this information, 
however, only when dealers asked, and the decision to 
ask might not be exogenous to the dealer's final offer. 
33Customer animus and search-cost theories of dis- 
crimination may not be independent. Neighborhoods 
with few black residents may also have stronger animus 
against black customers. This animus might swamp (or 
at least confound) the signaling effect and cause blacks 
bargaining in such neighborhoods to be quoted higher 
prices. 
2. Consumer Information .-Race or gen- 
der may also be correlated with buyers' 
information about the car market. For ex- 
ample, a recent study by the Consumer Fed- 
eration of America (1991) found that 37 
percent of respondents did not believe that 
the sticker price on a car was negotiable. 
More important for our purposes, there 
were wide differences in consumer knowl-
edge by race and gender. Sixty-one percent 
of blacks surveyed believed the price was 
not negotiable, while only 31 percent of 
whites believed this. Women were more 
likely than men to be misinformed about 
the willingness of dealers to bargain, al- 
though the disparities were not as great as 
between blacks and whites.34 
Sellers in our study may have been moti- 
vated in part by such informational dispari- 
ties in quoting higher prices to blacks and 
women. Dealers were somewhat more likely 
to volunteer information about the cost of 
the car to white males than to the other 
testers, possibly because they believed that 
white males already had such i n f ~ rma t i o n . ~~  
More significantly, dealers made their first 
offer at the sticker price to 29 percent of 
nonwhite males, but initially offered the 
sticker price to only 9 percent of white 
male testers (x;]= 25.9). This suggests that 
sellers believed white males were more 
knowledgeable than other testers about the 
possibility of bargaining over sticker prices. 
3. Bargaining Costs.-Another type of 
statistical discrimination might focus on 
34 Because the survey respondents were not limited 
to people who were actually interested in buying a car, 
the survey may overstate racial differences in informa- 
tion among the car-buying public (if nonbuying blacks 
are relatively less informed than nonbuying whites). 
George Moschis and Roy Moore (1981 p. 261), how- 
ever, find "differences in consumer knowledge, skills 
and attitudes between blacks and whites" controlling 
for actual purchase behavior. 
35 White males were given unsolicited cost informa- 
tion in 55 percent of their tests, while all other testers 
were given such information in 48 percent of tests. The 
difference was not statistically significant at the 5-per- 
cent level, however. 
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buyers' aversion to conducting negotiations. 
Some buyers experience the process of bar- 
gaining as costly, while others apparently 
derive pleasure from the give-and-take of 
negotiations. The key question in the pre- 
sent context is whether these bargaining 
costs are correlated with race or gender. We 
have no direct evidence on this point," but 
several findings suggest that dealers made it 
procedurally more difficult to purchase a 
car for "minority" testers. First, non-white- 
male testers were more often asked to sign 
purchase orders (40.2 percent vs. 27.6 per- 
cent for white males; x~:]7.14) and to put = 
down a deposit (37.7 percent vs. 25.6 per- 
cent for white males; XI:]  = 6.78). "Minor- 
ity" testers were also much more likely than 
white males to be "bumped," that is, to 
have the dealership manager raise a sales- 
person's offer (7.0 percent vs. 1.5 percent; 
x ~ : ~= 7.66). Forcing non-white-male testers 
to overcome these additional procedural 
hurdles might have been one way dealers 
tried to take advantage of what they per- 
ceived as the higher aversion to bargaining 
of "minority" testers relative to white males. 
IV. Conclusion 
In negotiations for more than 300 new 
cars, Chicago car dealers offered black and 
female testers significantly higher prices 
than the white males with whom they were 
paired, even though all testers used identi- 
cal bargaining strategies." This race and 
36 The social-psychology literature does not seem to 
have reached a firm conclusion on whether women 
bargain differently from men or blacks from whites 
(Jeffrey Rubin and Bert Brown, 1975). A recent news- 
paper article (Warren Brown, 1990) interviewed deal- 
ers who suggested that middle-class black males associ- 
ated needing to bargain with poverty and were thus 
reluctant to bargain. 
37 We should stress that these results may not be 
generalizable to a random sample of car buyers. Our 
testers employed a uniform bargaining strategy. If this 
strategy is atypical of the population at large, or if 
black and white consumers bargain differently, then 
the equilibrium amount of discrimination could be 
higher or lower than we observed. 
gender discrimination is a robust result, and 
the magnitude of discrimination is large 
enough that it cannot credibly be attributed 
to residual nonuniformities between types 
of testers. 
It is much more difficult to explain dis- 
crimination than to document its existence. 
The evidence that dealers occasionally used 
racist or sexist language, combined with the 
large (but statistically insignificant) savings 
that black testers encountered in black 
neighborhoods, justify lingering concerns 
about the possibility of animus or stereo-
typic discrimination. However, dealership 
conduct may be better explained as a form 
of statistical discrimination in which dealers 
use race and gender as a proxy for the 
customer's reservation price. 
It may be that simple theories of discrimi- 
nation fail to capture the mutually reinforc- 
ing nature of multiple causes. In the end, it 
may prove impossible to parse out the vari- 
ous elements of animus and rational infer- 
ences from irrational stereotypes. No single 
theory may be adequate to explain the ob- 
served discrimination against black men, 
black women, and white women. Whatever 
its causes, however, the discrimination un- 
covered in this study stands squarely in the 
face of earlier analyses that reject the possi- 
bility that discrimination can persist in a 
competitive market. 
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